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COMMENTS
sent his regrets, being unable to attend. The guests of honor were
the justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington,
and the Hon. Mr. Justice McDonald of British Columbia. Justice
McDonald delivered the principal address of the evening. Mr.
Stephen F. Chadwick of the Seattle Bar was the toastmaster.
Other speakers were Chief Justice Steinert and Justice Simpson.
Special entertainment was provided by the Varsity Quartet, and
the University of Washington Pep Band. A large number of the
members of the State Bar and Superior Court attended, as well
as the student body of the Law School, making a capacity crowd
of over three hundred. Dean Faulkner announced that Professor
Thomas Reed Powell, of the Harvard Law School, will teach constitutional law during the summer session of 1938.

COMMENTS
PHYSICIANS' AND HOSPITALS' LIENS ON TORT CLAIMS
FOR SERVICES RENDERED INJURED PARTY
The 1937 session of the Washington Legislature added the medical and allied services to the selective groups whose compensation
is protected in part by statutory liens. Chapter 69 of the laws of
that session awards a lien to operators of hospitals, licensed nurses,
practitioners, physicians and surgeons rendering service "for any
person who has received a traumatic injury."'- The lien is upon
"any claim, right of action and/or money to which such person
is entitled against any tort feasor and/or insurer of such tort
feasor". The amount of the lien is the "value" of the services,
plus costs and such reasonable attorney's fee as the court may
allow, incurred in enforcing the lien. The lien does not attach to
claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The total amount
of the liens cannot exceed twenty-five per cent of the "award,
2
verdict, report, decision, decree, judgment or settlement."
Lawyers, apparently, are not the only ones who sometimes feel
the need of protection against unfaithful or indigent clients. But
so far, in Washington, in handling personal injury business, they
have been content with protection afforded by the contract of
employment and their control over the litigation and settlement
negotiations. A lawyer in this state has no lien on his client's
cause of action. Some corresponding measure of protection is
given the lawyer by his lien on money of his client coming into
his hands, or on money in the hands of the adverse party to the
action." But his contract of employment does not protect him
against settlements directly with his client unless he has given
1

Session Laws, 1937, Chap. 69, p. 236.

'Ibid., § 1.
3

REmt. REv. STAT., § 136, P. C., § 185. Lien on money in hands of "adverse party" only when there is an action pending; Plummer v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 214, 110 Pac. 989, 31 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1215
(1910). Applicable to personal injury actions; Smith v. C. R. I. & P. R.
Co., 56 Iowa 720, 10 N. W. 244 (1881).
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notice of a claim of lien.4 Otherwise, the lawyer's lien goes only
to the judgment.
Such comparisons aside, however, the special protection afforded
one class of persons by chapter 69 can be seen to have some merit
on the assumption that the medical profession and its allied
services feel obliged to succor the victims of personal injury under
what are usually emergency conditions, they themselves running
a risk of ever having their certainly valuable services properly
recompensed. But it is a bit extravagant to also assume that the
usual victim of such injury is both ungrateful and unwilling to
pay. Looking at this statute in a colder light, the lien provided
for may work to render the injured person a disservice. So strong
a protection in the collection of the compensation for the particular services covered can have the unfortunate effect of emphasizing the commercial aspects necessarily incident to the most
humane profession; security for ultimate payment may turn rescue
work into a business; at least, it may seriously encumber the
speedy settlement of claims, a consummation so often desirable to
the one important party-the injured person. The legislature does
appear to have given the latter some thought, for the total amount
of liens in any one case is limited to twenty-five per cent of the
total award, etc. How this percentage is to be allocated among
several claimants in the case of overage, is not stated; on hypothesis, a horizontal deduction is to be applied to each lien. This
measure is calculated to stimulate the imagination of the lienor
when estimating the value of the services rendered, since there
is no way of estimating what settlement or verdict a particular
injury may bring.
Claims for personal torts usually are not assignable.' On this
and other grounds there is a general reluctance to subject such
claims to payment of the injured party's debts." Undoubtedly,
claims of this sort are property. Yet they are a very illusive kind
of property because both the liability and the amount of the
9
compensation are highly uncertain. In Johnson v. Dahlquist the
Washington Supreme Court found no difficulty in subjecting a
contract claim to execution. But in Swanson v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Company1° the court refused to commit itself
to extending the execution statute to "unliquidated causes of
action sounding in tort". Shortly before it had avoided the same
issue under the garnishment statute. 1 The language of the exe4McRea v. Warehime, 49 Wash. 194, 94 Pac. 924 (1908).
5

REar.

rEV.STAT. § 136, P. C. § 185. Settlement after trial but before

entry of judgment may defeat lien; Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood, 57
Wash. 239, 106 Pac. 742 (1910). Ace.: Boogren v. St. Paul City R. Co.,
97 Minn. 51, 106 N. W. 104, 3 L. R. A. (-.s.) 379 (1906).
'Chap. 69, § 1.
,See State ex rel. Baeder v. Blake, 107 Wash. 294, 181 Pac. 685 (1919)
and Slauson v. Schwabacher, 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892).
'See Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N. E. 887 (1907), Coty v.
Cogswell, 100 Mont. 496, 50 P. (2d) 249 (1935) and Toole v. Paumie
Parisian Dye House, 101 Mont. 74, 52 P. (2d) 162 (1935).
'130 Wash. 29, 225 Pac. 817 (1924).
1°90 Wash. Dec. 42, 66 P. (2d) 842 (1937, April).
"Pacific Mercantile Agency v. Keyes, 175 Wash. 618, 27 P. (2d) 1105.
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cution statute 2 does not justify a distinction; and it may be
doubted whether, as a matter of construction, a distinction can be
justified on principle unless it be upon the. grounds that contract
claims are assignable while claims for personal injuries are not
and the survival statute 8 indicates a clear legislative policy to
restrict the beneficiaries of this class of injuries to the victim and
his dependents. Chapter 69 departs from this policy, but it does
not aid in solving the problem involved in the Swanson case; the
remedy given the lienholder is not to foreclose on the cause of
action but to sue the tort feasor or his insurer. 4
Section 2 requires that the claim of lien be filed with the county
auditor within twenty days of the injury; or, if not so filed, at
any time before settlement or payment of the cause of action.
The filing of the claim is to be indexed as deeds and other conveyances are indexed (see. 3). The language of-section 2 does
not require a statement of an amount for which a lien is claimed
and twenty days is obviously too short a period of time for that
to be determined in a serious case.
Section 4 provides that taking a note or other evidence of indebtedness shall not discharge the lien unless expressly received
as payment and so specified therein.
Section 5 provides that the lien shall not be discharged by settlement of the cause of action unless provision be made for payment of the lien claim or a waiver or release of the lien be obtained. The sixth and last section provides for enforcement by
action at law against the tort feasor or his insurer within one
year after filing the lien and constitutes payment or settlement on
account of the injury prima facie evidence of the tort feasor's
negligence and the payer's liability to compensate.
Thus the tort feasor and insurer are placed in a position analagous to that of garnishees. Separately but not jointly. 15 Presumably, it is a matter of indifference to either to whom the
money measuring the compensation is paid. The injured party
has some protection against unfounded and excessive claims in
his power to call the lien claimants as witnesses on the elements
of damages;6 although there is no way of telling how much the
jury allowed in the verdict short of submitting special interrogatories. Probably the plaintiff would afterwards be estopped from
contesting either the claims or their amounts if obtaining a verdict, as having received a benefit accordingly. As to estimates of
expenses reasonably likely to be incurred after the trial, the plaintiff's position would not be so good. The judgment would determine the extent of the tort feasor's liability and also that of the
§ 7826-6.
"3Tbid., § 194, § 8275.
"Sec. 6.
'1Cf.: Pacific Mercantile Agency v. Keyes, supra note 11, where the
tort feasor only was originally garnisheed and the insurer brought in
after it had settled with the principal debtor; the answer of the garnishee denying liability.
" Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892);
Cole v. Seattle etc. R. Co., 42 Wash. 462, 85 Pac. 3 (1906); Webster v.
Seattle etc. R. Co., 42 Wash. 364, 85 Pac. 2 (1906).
"2REM. REV. STAT. § 518, P. C.
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insurer, but the statute transfers the lien to the money and the
judgment does not stop its accrual.17
Like a garnishee who turns over money or property to his creditor, the settling tort feasor and his insurer pay at their peril
as against properly filed lien claims.' Payment is voluntary in
the face of such claims and recourse to the payee must needs depend upon mutual mistake or fraud. 9 The injured person's statement as to services rendered could be taken, but such statement
would not be binding upon any lienor. Practically, releases or receipts after liens filed must be obtained, as well as consent of the
injured person. The twenty-day period allowed lien claimants in
any event and the statutory presumption of negligence and liability attaching to payment, will militate against over-hasty settlements and may be made a definite implement of delay.
As to insurers, the lien is upon "any claim, right of action
and/or money to which (the injured person) is entitled against
the tort feasor and/or the insurer of such tort feasor." This
language is broad enough to reach any money to which the injured person becomes entitled under a settlement offered and
accepted; and, as well, money voluntarily paid in satisfaction of
a judgment against an insured. These are usual situations arising under liability policies. In case of litigation covered by a
liability policy, the injured person after judgment against the
tort feasor can reach the money due under the policy by garnishment; or action if the policy so provides;2° and the money so
seqestered would seem to be subject to the lien. But when the policy is one of indemnity only, the claim of the injured person
against the tort feasor must be satisfied before any money becomes
due under the policy; so the injured person can acquire no right
against the insurer, 21 and there is nothing to which the lien can
attach. A similar situation may arise under a liability policy when
the insurer denies liability and the insured tort feasor settles
without satisfying the lien. Although, under section 5, the lien is
not discharged by the settlement, it can continue only against
the tort feasor as the injured person never acquired any right to
the money due under the policy. An injured person may, by
statute, 2, or by the terms of the policy,22 be given a right of action
directly against an insurer and the lien will attach to such "right
of action and/or money" due from the insurer.
When the injured person dies before settlement or final judg'-Chap. 69, § 1.
'1Ibid., § 5. Cf.: REm. R v. STAT. § 688, P. C. § 8007; Lemagie v. Acme
Stamp Works, 98 Wash. 34, 167 Pac. 60 (1917).
"See Daughn v. J. B. McKee Co., (Tex. C. A.) 124 S. W. 732 (1910).

"Johnson v. McGilchrist, 174 Wash. 178, 24 P. (2d) 607 (1933); Finkelberg v. Continental Casualty Co., 126 Wash. 543, 219 Pac. 12 (1923).
"Ford v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 70 Wash. 29, 126 Pac. 69 (1912);
Luger v. Windell, 116 Wash. 375, 199 Pac. 760 (1921).
"Cf.: Devoto v. United Auto Transportation Co., 128 Wash. 604, 130
Wash. 707, 223 Pac. 1050, 226 Pac. 1118 (1924).
"See Keseleff v. Sunset Highway Motor Freight Co., 187 Wash. 642,
60 P. (2d) 720 (1936) setting out form of indorsement required on carrier policies by Department of Public Works. See also Finkelberg v.
Continental Casualty Co., supra, note 20.
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ment, his right of action survives only as provided by Rem. Stat.
sec. 194, P. C. see. 8275. Under this statute survival is conditioned
upon death being caused by the injury, and the recovery is for
the sole benefit of the persons enumerated in the statute, which
does not include creditors of the decedent.24 The action for wrongful death given by Rem. Rev. Stat. see. 183 et seq., P. C. see.
8259 et seq., of course, is an independent right of action and cannot constitute any "claim, right of action and/or money" to which
the injured person is entitled. Accordingly, when the injured
person dies before settlement or final judgment there would not
seem to be any claim, or right of
action, and no money, surviving
25
to which this lien could attach.

If it is the tort feasor who dies, there being no statute in the
state to the contrary, the injured person's claim or right of action
is at an end ;26 and the subject matter of the lien ceases to exist.
A more difficult problem will present itself where the injured person is given a direct action against the tort feasor's. insurer. In
such a case the argument may be advanced that the cause of action
sounds in contract and not in tort, so does not abate with the
death of the tort feasor. Yet the Washington statutes which
require insurance coverage by motor vehicle carriers seem to contemplate a concurrent liability of the insured as the basis of an
action against the insurer. 27 Since it is the liability to make
compensation for personal injury which terminates with the tort
feasor's death, it.would seem immaterial whether the action is in
tort or in contract. 2 In either case the claim or right of action
of the injured person ceases and so does the lien.
"2See Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 136, 292 Pac. 436 (1930).
sCf.: Young v. Ostrander, 270 Ill. App. 368 (1933-); Topping v. Town
of St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526, 57 N. W. 365 (1893).
"See Rinker v. Hurd, 69 Wash. 257, 124 Pac. 687 (1912); Bortle v.
Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 Pac. 425 (1930); also, State ex rel. Baeder v.
Blake, 107 Wash. 294, 181 Pac. 685 (1919).
21See, REm. REV. STAT. § 6384, P. C. § 237; REm. REV. STAT. § 6391, P. C.,
§ 234-7; Laws 1933, Chap. 166, § 15; laws 1933 (Extra Session), Chap.
55, § 7; Laws 1935, Chap. 184, §§ 16, 17; Laws 1937, Chap. 166, § 14;
Devoto v. United Auto Txansportation Co., 128 Wash. 604, 130 Wash.
707, 223 Pac. 1050, 226 Pac. 1118 (1924); Keseleff v. Sunset Highway
Motor Freight Co., 187 Wash. 642, 60 P. (2d) 720 (1936).
2Cf.: Bernstein v. Queens County Jockey Club, 225 N. Y. S. 449 (1927).
See Jonas v. Taylor, 166 Wash. 302, 6 P. (2d) 615 (1932). Action on
police officer's bond, cause of action held to terminate with death of
officer. Note: 78 A. L..R. 600 (1932).

